In the multisensor sequential change detection problem, a disruption occurs in an environment monitored by multiple sensors. This disruption induces a change in the observations of an unknown subset of sensors. In the Byzantine version of this problem, which is the focus of this work, it is further assumed that the postulated change-point model may be misspecified for an unknown subset of sensors. The problem then is to detect the change quickly and reliably, for any possible subset of affected sensors, even if the misspecified sensors are controlled by an adversary. Given a user-specified upper bound on the number of compromised sensors, we propose and study three families of sequential change-detection rules for this problem. These are designed and evaluated under a generalization of Lorden's criterion, where conditional expected detection delay and expected time to false alarm are both computed in the worst-case scenario for the compromised sensors. The first-order asymptotic performance of these procedures is characterized as the worst-case false alarm rate goes to 0. The insights from these theoretical results are corroborated by a simulation study.
I. INTRODUCTION
S UPPOSE that a system is monitored in real time by multiple sensors that communicate with a fusion center. At an unknown time, a disruption occurs and induces a change in the observations of a subset of deployed sensors. In this context, the multisensor (or multichannel) sequential (or quickest) change detection problem is to combine at the fusion center the information from all sensors in order to detect the change as soon as possible, while controlling the rate of false alarms. This problem has been studied extensively when the change is perceived by exactly one unknown sensor [1] - [6] . The assumption of a unique affected sensor has been removed in various recent works, where the change is allowed to affect an arbitrary, unknown subset of sensors [7] - [9] . In this context, even in the absence of any information regarding the affected sensors, it is possible to achieve the optimal detection performance, in Lorden's sense [10] , up to a first-order asymptotic approximation [7] , or even up to a constant term [9] , as the false alarm rate goes to 0. In a related line of research, the affected sensors perceive the change at possibly different times [11] - [15] , and the goal is to detect the first of these times.
In all these references it is assumed that the observations in the unaffected sensors continue to behave in the same way as before the disruption takes place. A different formulation, inspired by the Byzantine generals problem in fault tolerant design [16] , was considered in [17] . There, it was assumed that the change is perceived by all sensors apart from a single, unknown sensor that is compromised, in the sense that its observations are generated by an adversary. This formulation is motivated by the interest in designing fault tolerant quickest detection schemes in security related scenarios, where an adversary might take control of certain deployed sensors in order to foil change-detection schemes. We can also think of this formulation as a robust version of the classical multichannel sequential change-detection problem, where the postulated model in some sensors is not correctly specified.
The solution that was proposed in [17] for this problem was a decentralized second alarm, where each sensor computes its local Cumulative Sums (CUSUM) statistic [18] , raises an alarm as soon as this statistic exceeds a fixed threshold, and the fusion center stops as soon as two distinct sensors have raised an alarm. This scheme was analyzed under a generalized version of Lorden's criterion, where the worst case scenario is considered for the change-point, the observations up to the change-point, and also the strategy of the adversary. In this context, it was shown that the worst-case conditional expected detection delay of the second alarm grows logarithmically with its worst-case expected time to false alarm, a property that is not enjoyed by the centralized CUSUM, which assumes that all sensors are honest and affected. Moreover, it was shown that the performance of the second alarm can be significantly improved if it is applied, in a centralized fashion, to three disjoint groups of sensors. However, the asymptotic performance of these two schemes was not characterized, and neither of them was shown to be efficient or optimal in any sense.
In this work, we generalize the Byzantine sequential change detection proposed in [17] in two ways. First, we allow for more than one sensors to be compromised, and second, we allow for only an unknown subset of honest sensors to be affected by the change. Thus, we have three groups of sensors: the corrupt (or compromised) ones, which are assumed to be controlled by an adversary, the honest ones that perceive the change, and the honest ones that do not perceive the change.
In this context, we propose and study three families of multichannel, sequential change-detection rules, each parametrized by a number L that takes values between 1 and K , the total number of sensors. All proposed procedures require the computation of the local CUSUM statistic at each sensor. In the first one, the fusion center raises an alarm when L individual local CUSUM statistics have crossed a common threshold, and we refer to it as the L th alarm; the second alarm proposed in [17] is a special case of this family (L = 2). In the second, the fusion center stops when L sensors agree that the change has occurred, in the sense that their corresponding local CUSUM statistics are simultaneously above a common threshold; we refer to it as voting rule, since it requires from each sensor to "vote" at each time whether the change has occurred. In the third one, the fusion center stops when the sum of the L smallest local CUSUM statistics exceeds a threshold, and we refer to it as Low-Sum-CUSUM.
We assume that there is a known, user-specified upper bound, M, on the number of compromised sensors, and we design and analyze the proposed schemes under a generalization of Lorden's criterion, where the conditional expected detection delay and expected time to false alarm are evaluated when there are exactly M corrupt sensors and under the worst case regarding the strategy of the adversary.
The main contributions of this work are the following: first of all, for each family of detection rules under consideration, we obtain bounds on L so that the resulting rules can control the worst-case false alarm rate below an arbitrary, userspecified level, and achieve non-trivial detection performance whenever there are more affected honest sensors than corrupt. A particular case of interest arises when there are exactly M + 1 honest sensors, all of them affected by the change (K − M = M + 1). In this case, the only possible value for L is M + 1 in all schemes, and the three resulting procedures are shown to be strictly ordered. Specifically, for any given false alarm rate, the (M + 1)-alarm is shown to be strictly better than the corresponding voting rule, and the latter strictly better than the corresponding Low-Sum-CUSUM.
In order to select the parameter L and compare the proposed procedures when K − M > M + 1, we conduct an asymptotic analysis and characterize their performance up to a first-order asymptotic approximation as the worst-case false alarm rate goes to 0. These asymptotic results suggest that the most appropriate choice for L is M +1 for the L th alarm and K − M for Low-Sum-CUSUM. With this selection of L, the first-order asymptotic detection delay of Low-Sum-CUSUM is |B| − M times smaller than that of the (M + 1)-alarm, where B is the affected subset and |B| its size.
On the other hand, the proposed choice for L, and the resulting asymptotic performance, in the family of voting rules depends on the prior knowledge regarding the size of the affected subset, |B|. In the absence of any information, we suggest setting L = M + 1, in which case the resulting voting rule has the same first-order asymptotic performance as the (M + 1)-alarm. When |B| is known in advance, we suggest setting L = |B|, in which case the resulting voting rule has the same first-order asymptotic performance as Low-Sum-CUSUM.
Finally, similarly to [17] , when K > 2M + 1 we also consider a centralized version of the (M + 1)-alarm and quantify its asymptotic performance when it is known in advance that all honest sensors are affected. In this setup, we show that the first-order asymptotic performance of the centralized (M + 1)-alarm is K /(2M + 1) smaller than that of the decentralized (M + 1)-alarm. The resulting performance however is inferior to that of the voting rule and Low-Sum-
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section II we formulate the problem mathematically. In Section III we study various CUSUM-based, sequential change-detection procedures in the classical formulation where there are no corrupt sensors, or equivalently the honest sensors are known in advance. In Section IV we introduce and study the proposed procedures in the presence of corrupt sensors. In Section V we present the results of two simulation studies that illustrate our theoretical findings. We conclude in Section VI. The statements and proofs of some auxiliary results, which are used throughout the paper, are presented in an Appendix.
In what follows, we denote by (1) a non-zero constant term, by O(1) a bounded from above term, and by o(1) a vanishing term in a limiting sense that will be understood by the context. We set
Moreover, we set x + = max{x, 0} and denote by | · | the size of a set.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Suppose data are collected sequentially from K sensors. For each k ∈ [K ], let X k ≡ {X k t } t ∈N be the sequence of observations in the k th sensor, where N ≡ {1, 2, . . .} and [K ] ≡ {1, . . . , K }. We assume that there is a subset N ⊆ [K ] of independent sensors, in the sense that {X k , k ∈ N } are independent sequences. For each k ∈ N , X k is a sequence of independent random variables, initially distributed according to some density f . This density changes in a subset of sensors, B ⊆ N , at some unknown, deterministic point in time ν ∈ {0, 1, . . .} (change-point). That is,
We assume that f and g are known densities with respect to a σ -finite measure λ and denote by I their Kullback-Leibler information number:
This is a homogeneous change-point model, in the sense that the pre-change densities are the same in all sensors, and so are the post-change densities in those sensors that perceive the change. We assume that I > 0 without loss of generality, since otherwise f = g λ-almost everywhere, and also I < ∞, which is a standard assumption in the asymptotic analysis of sequential change-detection procedures (see e.g., [10] ). We will refer to certain results in the literature that require the following second-moment assumption:
However, our standing assumption throughout the paper is that (2) holds, and will not be stated explicitly from now on.
Since the change-point is unknown and observations are collected sequentially, the problem is to find a stopping rule that determines when to stop and declare that the change has occurred based on the data from all sensors. More formally, a sequential change-detection rule is an {F t }-stopping time, where F t is the σ -field generated by the observations in all sensors up to time t, i.e.,
. Our goal is to propose detection rules that are able to detect the change quickly and reliably even in the worst-case scenario that the sensors that do not belong to N are controlled by an adversary who tries to prevent the detection of the change. Thus, we refer to the sensors in N as honest, and to those that do not belong to N as corrupt, or compromised. Moreover, we refer to the sensors in B ⊆ N as affected (by the change), and to the ones in N \ B as unaffected (by the change).
We assume that there are at most M corrupt sensors, where M ≥ 0 is a user-specified number that can be determined based on prior information on the quality of each sensor. Alternatively, we can think of M as a parameter that represents the amount of robustness that we want to introduce to the classical multichannel problem, which corresponds to the case M = 0. When M = 1 we recover the setup considered in [17] .
We consider the worst possible scenario regarding the number of corrupt sensors and the strategy of the adversary. Indeed, our analysis focuses on the case that there are exactly M corrupt sensors, and consequently |N | = K − M honest sensors, with the understanding that the proposed procedures will still be effective when the true number of corrupt sensors is smaller than M. Since we consider a homogeneous changepoint model, we can assume without loss of generality that the subset of honest sensors, N , is an arbitrary subset of size K − M. This allows us to lighten the notation, suppressing in what follows the dependence on N and M of many quantities of interest.
In order to identify the worst-case regarding the strategy of the adversary, we assume that the latter knows the true change-point and affected subset, and has the same access to the observations of the honest sensors as the fusion center. To be more specific, let H t denote the σ -field generated by the observations in the honest sensors up to time t, i.e.
its dependence on N . Then, we assume that the observations in the corrupt sensors at time t form a H t -measurable random vector, i.e., there is a Borel function π t so that
where for each subset C ⊆ [K ] and time t we use the following notation:
We define the strategy of the adversary as the family of deterministic functions π ≡ {π t : t ∈ N}, suppressing its dependence on N , ν and B. We will consider the worst-case scenario regarding π when we evaluate both the detection delay and the false alarm rate of a procedure.
We denote the probability measure in the underlying canonical space by P B,π ν when the change occurs at time ν in a subset B ⊆ N of honest sensors and the strategy of the adversary is π, with the understanding that under P π ∞ there is no change in the honest sensors. We simply write P B ν and P ∞ instead of P B,π ν and P π ∞ when the event of interest depends only on observations from the honest sensors. Following Lorden's [10] approach, we quantify the delay of a sequential changedetection rule T when the change occurs in subset B with the following criterion:
ν . Thus, we consider the worst-case scenario with respect to change-point ν and the observations until the time of the change, as in Lorden's criterion, but now we also consider the worst-case scenario regarding the strategy of the adversary, when it controls exactly M sensors. We also take a worst-case approach in the quantification of the expected time to false alarm, which we define as follows:
We denote by C γ the class of sequential change-detection rules for which the worst-case expected time to false alarm is bounded below by some user-specified constant γ > 1, i.e., C γ = {T : A[T ] ≥ γ }. We are interested in designing sequential change-detection rules that belong to C γ for some arbitrary γ > 1, and at the same time have "small" worstcase detection delay, J B , for (ideally) every possible affected subset, B. This will turn out to be possible for the proposed procedures only when the size of the affected subset, |B|, is larger than M. With this in mind, we introduce the following notion of domination in order to compare detection rules in our context. Definition 1: Let T and S be two multichannel sequential change-detection rules. We say that
Such a strict domination property will arise only in the special case that K = 2M + 1. In general, our comparisons will rely on asymptotic approximations as the worst-case false alarm rate goes to 0, which leads to the following definition.
Definition 2: Let T and S be multichannel sequential change-detection rules. We say that S is asymptotically more
III. THE CLASSICAL MULTICHANNEL SETUP In this section we consider the classical multichannel framework where there are no corrupt sensors, or equivalently the subset, N , of honest sensors is known in advance, but the subset of affected sensors, B ⊆ N , is not. The procedures and results of this section will provide the basis for the methods and analysis in Section IV where N will also be unknown. However, the results in this section may also be of independent interest for the classical multichannel problem itself, as we revisit various multichannel, CUSUM-based schemes in the literature.
A. Notation
For each C ⊆ N and t ∈ N we denote by Z C t the cumulative log-likelihood ratio of the first t observations in the sensors in C, i.e.,
where k t is the log-likelihood ratio of the t th observation in sensor k, i.e.,
We denote by W C t Page's [18] CUSUM statistic at time t for detecting a change in subset C ⊆ N , i.e.,
We denote by σ C (h) the corresponding CUSUM stopping time, that is the first time the process W C exceeds a positive threshold h, i.e.,
When C = {k} for some k ∈ C, we simply write
and σ {k} (h). Moreover, we use the following notation for the ordered local CUSUM stopping times and statistics:
B. Centralized CUSUM and the Optimal Performance It is useful for the subsequent development to recall some well-known properties of the centralized CUSUM stopping time, σ C (h). For every s ∈ N and C ⊆ N we have (see, e.g., [19, Appendix 2] ) that
In fact, σ C (h)/e h is asymptotically exponential (see, e.g., [2] ), and consequently as h → ∞
Moreover, we have the following decomposition of the CUSUM detection statistic
which implies that W C t ≥ Z C t for every t. In view of this decomposition, from non-linear renewal theory [20, Sec. 2.6] it follows that when C is included in the affected subset (C ⊆ B), then as h → ∞
and consequently for any r ≥ 1
Since
When in particular
within the class of detection rules C γ [21] . This optimality property, combined with (13) , implies that a first-order approximation to the optimal performance as γ → ∞ is
a result that was originally established in [10] in a different way. We will refer to σ B as the optimal or oracle CUSUM, as it achieves the optimal performance but requires knowledge of the actual affected subset.
C. Decentralized, Multichannel Detection Rules
When the subset of affected sensors is not known in advance, it is desirable to design procedures that have "good" performance under any possible affected subset. This is known to be possible even in the absence of any prior information regarding the affected subset. Indeed, under the second moment condition (3), the optimal performance is achievable up to a constant term under any possible affected subset, e.g., by the GLR-CUSUM, min C⊆N σ C (h), with h = log γ [9] . While this is a recursive rule, the number of recursions it requires grows exponentially with the number of honest sensors, |N |. On the other hand, it is possible to achieve the optimal performance for any possible affected subset, up to a first-order asymptotic approximation, by a procedure whose detection statistic is an increasing function of the local CUSUM statistics (see Subsection III-E). In this work, we focus on multichannel sequential procedures of this form, and the following lemma is useful for analyzing their worstcase detection delay.
Lemma 3: Let ψ : [0, ∞) |N | → [0, ∞) be a non-constant function that is increasing in each of its arguments, and consider the detection rule
The worst-case scenario for the observations up to the time of the change ν is that W k ν = 0 for every k ∈ N . Under P ∞ , the process (W 1 , . . . , W N ) is a Markov chain that regenerates whenever all its components are equal to 0, which completes the proof.
D. One-Shot Schemes and Voting Rules
Let 1 ≤ L ≤ |N |. We refer to σ (L) (h), defined in (7) , as the L th honest alarm, since it represents the first time the local CUSUM statistics in L honest sensors have crossed level h. A related stopping rule is
which is the first time the local CUSUM statistics in L honest sensors are simultaneously above h; we will refer to it as voting rule, since it requires from each sensor to "vote" at each time whether the change has occurred or not. In general, we have σ (L) (h) ≤ S L (h) for every h > 0 and 1 ≤ L ≤ |N |, with equality when L = 1. The first-alarm, σ (1) , achieves the optimal asymptotic performance (14) when |B| = 1, i.e., when exactly one sensor is affected by the change [4] , [5] .
The "consensus" rule, S |N | , which stops when all honest local CUSUM statistics are simultaneously above a common threshold, is also known to be asymptotically optimal when all honest sensors are affected by the change (B = N ) [22] . These two results were shown recently [23] to be special cases of a more general result, according to which the voting rule, S L , achieves the optimal first-order asymptotic performance (14) when L is equal to the size of the affected subset, |B|.
In Theorem 8 we establish this result under only the first moment condition (2), removing the second moment condition (3) that was assumed in both [22] and [23] .
Proof: The lower bound in (16) was established in [23, Th. 3.2]. The asymptotic approximation in (17) follows from the asymptotic exponentiality [2] of the independent stopping times σ k (h), 1 ≤ k ≤ |N |.
It is clear that for both σ (L) and S L to have non-trivial detection performance, L needs to be at most equal to the size of the affected subset, |B|. Indeed, when L > |B|, at least one of the L alarms needs to come from an unaffected sensor, and consequently S L (h) ≥ σ (L) (h) ≥ min k∈N \B σ k (h), which means that the expected detection delay of σ (L) and S L will be larger than the expected time to false alarm from at least one of the unaffected sensors. Thus, the following lemma describes the asymptotic detection delay of σ (L) and S L when L ≤ |B|.
Lemma 5:
Proof: For every h > 0 and 1 ≤ L ≤ |B| we clearly have σ (1) (1)),
For every h > 0 we have
The asymptotic upper bound in (19) then follows from Lemma 33 in the Appendix. It remains to prove the asymptotic lower bound in (19) . To this end, we observe that σ (1) can be represented as the minimum of a stopping time that perceives the change and one that does not. Specifically:
It then suffices to show that as h → ∞ we have
In order to prove (20) we rely on Lemma 31(ii) in the Appendix. From Boole's inequality, for every t = 0, 1, . . ., we have
where the last inequality follows from (8) . Moreover, setting r = 2 in (12) we have
In view of Lemma 31(ii) in the Appendix, these two inequalities prove (20) . Finally, we obtain (21) from
and Fatou's lemma, the former following from (11) . Based on these two lemmas, we can now show that the first-order asymptotic performance of the L th honest alarm is independent of L. This result was shown in [23] under the second-moment condition (3), which is removed in the following theorem.
If also L ≤ |B|, then
Proof: We obtain (22) directly from (17) . We obtain (23) by setting h = h γ in (18) and the fact that worst-case scenario for the change-point is ν = 0.
Remark 7: Theorem 17 reveals that the L th honest alarm has the same first-order asymptotic performance for any value of L between 1 and |B|. In the absence of any information regarding the size of the affected subset, L needs to be set equal to 1. However, Theorem 6 does not reveal how to select L when the size of the affected subset, |B|, is known in advance. This question was addressed in [23] , where it was shown, under the second moment assumption (3) , that the second-order term in the asymptotic expansion of the detection delay of the L th alarm is a term of order √ log γ whose coefficient is decreasing in L. This suggests setting L = 1 independently of any prior information regarding the size of the affected subset.
We now establish the asymptotic optimality of the voting rule, S L , when the size of the affected subset is equal to L, without the second moment condition that was assumed in [23] . Moreover, we show that the exponential lower bound (16) is sharp in the exponent.
Theorem 8:
When in particular L = |B|,
Proof: Asymptotic approximation (25) follows directly from (18) and (24), therefore it suffices to show the other two claims of the theorem.
For every 1 ≤ L ≤ |N | we have from (16) 
Therefore, setting h = h γ in (18) and recalling Lemma 3 we obtain
When in particular L = |B|, this asymptotic upper bound coincides with the optimal asymptotic performance (14) , and implies (26) . Finally, in view of (27) , in order to establish (24) it suffices to show that as γ → ∞
We will prove this by contradiction. Indeed, suppose there is
which contradicts (26) when L = |B|. Remark 9: Suppose that it is known in advance that at least Q sensors are affected, i.e., |B| ≥ Q, where Q is some known number between 1 and |N |. Any value of L between 1 and Q guarantees non-trivial detection delay for the corresponding voting rule, but the resulting first-order asymptotic detection delay is now decreasing in L. This suggests setting L equal to the largest possible value, i.e., Q. Note however that due to the effect of the second-order term in the asymptotic approximation of the detection delay (see Remark 7) , it has been argued that a smaller value for L, such as L = Q/2 may lead to better performance in practice [23] .
E. Sum-CUSUM
Let C ⊆ N and denote by ρ C (h) the first time the sum of the local CUSUM statistics in C is above h, i.e.,
This detection rule, to which we will refer as Sum-CUSUM, was proposed in [7] and was shown to achieve the optimal performance to a first-order asymptotic approximation (14) for any possible affected subset when C = N . In Theorem 12 we characterize the first-order asymptotic performance of ρ C whenever C intersects with the affected subset, B, and recover the result in [7] as a special case. We note however that our proof differs from that in [7] as far as it concerns the proof of the lower bound in (29). Lemma 10: For any C ⊆ N we have as h → ∞
Proof: By definition, ρ C (h) ≤ σ (1) (h) for every h > 0, therefore the upper bound in (29) follows from (17) . It remains to prove the lower bound. From (8) it follows that W k s is stochastically bounded by an exponential random variable with mean 1 for every s ∈ N and k ∈ C. As a result, k∈C W k s is stochastically bounded by an Erlang random variable with parameter |C|, i.e.,
For any t ∈ N and h > 0, from Boole's inequality we have
and from Lemma 31(i) in the Appendix we conclude that for
which implies the asymptotic lower bound in (29).
Proof: For every t ∈ N we observe that
therefore for every h > 0 we have
and from the asymptotic approximation (6) we obtain
It remains to show that o(1) ).
This will follow directly from Fatou's lemma as soon as we prove that as h → ∞
In view of decomposition (10) (2)), and as a result for every t ∈ N we
The second one holds because from (31) we have for every > 0 that
and the upper bound goes to 0 as t → ∞ in view of (32). We now characterize the performance of ρ C up to a firstorder asymptotic approximation whenever C intersects with B.
Theorem 12:
and
When in particular B ⊆ C, we have as γ → ∞
Proof: From (29) it follows that if we set h = h γ so that E ∞ [ρ C (h γ )] = γ , then as γ → ∞ we have (1 + o(1) ).
Taking logarithms and dividing by log γ we obtain (36). The asymptotic approximation in (37) follows from (33) and (36). Comparing the asymptotic upper bound (37) when B ⊆ C with the optimal asymptotic performance in (14) we obtain (38).
F. Top-Sum-CUSUM
Let 1 ≤ L ≤ |N | and denote by S L (h) the first time the sum of the L largest honest, local CUSUM statistics is above h, i.e.,
to which we will refer as Top-Sum-CUSUM. This detection rule reduces to the first honest alarm, σ (1) , when L = 1, and to Sum-CUSUM, ρ N , when L = |N |. It has been proposed [24] as an efficient modification of Sum-CUSUM when the size of the affected subset is known to be smaller or equal to L, i.e., |B| ≤ L. Here, we analyze its asymptotic performance for any value of L. Lemma 13: Let 1 ≤ L ≤ |N |. Then, for any subset B ⊆ N we have as h → ∞
Proof: We observe that
When L > |N | − |B|, S L (h) can be expressed as follows
When L ≤ |N | − |B|, S L can be represented as the minimum of two independent stopping times as follows:
where
It then suffices to show that for every 1 ≤ L ≤ |N | we have as h → ∞
and that for every 1 ≤ L ≤ |N | − |B| we have as h → ∞
We start with the proof of (43). For every subset C ⊆ N of size L that intersects with B we have
where the asymptotic equivalence follows from (33). Minimizing the asymptotic upper bound with respect to C we obtain
In order to prove (43), it remains to show that o(1) ).
This follows from Fatou's lemma and
the latter being a consequence of (35) and (46). In order to prove (44), we focus without loss of generality on the case that L ≤ |N | − |B|, and we utilize Lemma 31 (ii) in the Appendix. We observe that for every C ⊆ N of size L that intersects with B, we have φ B L (h) ≤ ρ C (h) ≤ σ C∩B (h) for every h, where the second inequality follows from (34). Therefore, setting r = 2 in (12) we obtain
Moreover, for every h > 0 we have χ B L (h) ≥ ρ N \B (h), and consequently for every t ∈ N we obtain
where the second inequality follows from (31). From the definition of H N \B in (30) it follows that h 2 H N \B (h) → 0 as h → ∞, which completes the proof of (44). We now characterize the asymptotic performance of Top-Sum-CUSUM.
Theorem 14:
When in particular L ≥ |B|,
Proof: For every h > 0 and 1 ≤ L ≤ |N | we have
From (22) and (36) it follows that if we set h = h γ so that E ∞ [ S L (h γ )] = γ , then as γ → ∞ we have (1 + o(1) ).
Taking logarithms and dividing by h γ we obtain that h γ ∼ log γ . This observation, combined with Lemma 13 implies (47). Finally, (48) follows by comparing (47) with the optimal asymptotic performance (14) when L ≥ |B|.
G. Low-Sum-CUSUM
Let 1 ≤ L ≤ |N | and denote by S L (h) the first time the sum of the L smallest honest, local CUSUM statistics is above h, i.e.,
to which we will refer as Low-Sum-CUSUM. It is clear that S L reduces to the consensus rule, S |N | , when L = 1, and to Sum-CUSUM, ρ N , when L = |N |. To the best of our knowledge, this procedure has not been studied when 1 < L < |N |.
In Theorem 17 we show that S L is asymptotically optimal, for any choice of L, when all honest sensors are affected by this change (B = N ). This rule will turn out to be well-suited to address the presence of corrupt sensors, which is our focus in the next section.
Proof: For any t ∈ N and h > 0, from Boole's inequality we have
is stochastically bounded by an exponential random variable with mean 1, therefore L k=1 W (k) s is stochastically bounded by the sum of the smallest L, among |N |, independent exponential random variables with mean 1. Therefore, from Lemma 32 in the Appendix we obtain
where G L is defined in (77). From Lemma 31(i) in the Appendix we conclude that E ∞ [ S L (h)] ≥ 1/(2 G L (h)) for every h > 0, and from Lemma 32 in the Appendix we have that as h → ∞
which implies (50). It is clear that Low-Sum-CUSUM has non-trivial detection performance whenever L is larger than the number of nonaffected sensors, |N | − |B|, so that there is always at least one term in the detection statistic that corresponds to a local CUSUM statistic from an affected sensor. Under this assumption, we now characterize its worst-case detection delay up to a first-order asymptotic approximation.
Lemma 16: If L > |N | − |B|, then as h → ∞ we have
Proof: For any t ∈ N and 1 ≤ L ≤ |N | we have
When L > |N | − |B|, a lower bound for the sum of the L smallest honest CUSUM statistics is obtained when we set the CUSUM statistics in the |N |−|B| unaffected sensors equal to 0. Then, for every t ∈ N we have
where the second inequality holds because Z k t ≤ W k t for every t. As a result, for every h > 0 we have
Then, from Lemma 33 in the Appendix it follows that as h → ∞ o(1) ).
In order to show that this asymptotic upper bound is sharp, we observe that from the definition of ρ C in (28) and (52) we have
From (35) we know that for any subset C that intersects with B
Therefore, from Fatou's lemma we obtain o(1) ).
This asymptotic lower bound and (53) imply
which completes the proof. In the following theorem we show that Low-Sum-CUSUM preserves, for any choice of L, the asymptotic optimality of the consensus rule, S 1 ≡ S |N | , when all honest sensors are affected by the change (B = N ) . This asymptotic optimality property allows us further to show that the exponential lower bound in (50) is sharp in the exponent.
Theorem 17:
Suppose further that L > |N | − |B|. Then as γ → ∞
In the special case that all honest sensors are affected (B = N ), for every 1 ≤ L ≤ |N | we have
Proof: Asymptotic approximation (55) follows directly by (51) and (54), thus, we focus on the proof of the two other claims. From (50) it follows that if h = h γ so that
(57) From Lemma 3, (51) and (57) we have o(1) ).
Comparing this asymptotic upper bound with the optimal asymptotic performance (14) when B = N , we obtain the asymptotic optimality property (56).
In view of (57), in order to prove (54) it suffices to show that as γ → ∞ o(1) ).
This will follow by arguing via contradiction. Indeed, if there is a subsequence h γ so that h γ ≤ (L /|N |) log γ as γ → ∞ for some L > L, then from Lemma 16 it follows that
which contradicts (56).
IV. THE BYZANTINE SETUP
In this section we focus on the main theme of this paper, that is the design of multichannel, sequential change-detection procedures that are robust in the presence of corrupt sensors.
We will still utilize the notation introduced in Subsection III-A when we refer to events that depend only on honest sensors. However, we will now need some additional notation when we do not know whether the sensors to which we refer are honest or corrupt. Thus, for any subset of sensors C ⊆ [K ] we denote by Y C the CUSUM statistic for detecting a change in subset C, i.e.,
where Y C 0 ≡ 0 and k t is defined in (5) . We denote by τ C (h) be the first time the process Y C exceeds a positive threshold h, i.e., and τ {k} (h). Finally, we use the following notation for the ordered local CUSUM stopping times and statistics:
Our goal is to design procedures that are able to detect the change quickly and reliably, in the worst case scenario regarding the corrupt sensors, for any subset of honest sensors that perceive the change. To this end, we assume that there is a user-specified upper bound, M, on the number of corrupt sensors, and we focus our analysis on the worst possible case that there are exactly M corrupt sensors, with the understanding that the proposed procedures will still be able to detect the change reliably when the actual number of corrupt sensors is smaller than M. Thus, from now on we have |N | = K − M, and consequently 1 ≤ |B| ≤ K − M, since B ⊆ N .
A. The Proposed Procedures
We will study three of the families of multichannel detection schemes that we considered in the previous section: the L th alarm, τ (L) (h), defined in (60), the voting rule
and Low-Sum-CUSUM,
where L is some number between 1 and K . Thus, τ (L) (h) is the first time L sensors, honest or not, cross threshold h, T L (h) is the first time L CUSUM statistics, honest or not, are simultaneously above threshold h, and T L (h) is the first time the sum of the L smallest local, honest or not, CUSUM statistics is larger than h. Remark 18: We do not consider Top-Sum-CUSUM in this context, because with any rule of this family the adversary can trigger unilaterally false alarms before the change, violating the desired false alarm control.
B. Preliminary Results
The following lemma is important for the subsequent development, as it represents the operating characteristics of the proposed procedures in terms of operating characteristics of schemes that involve only honest sensors. It also reveals that only values of L larger than M are relevant for all three schemes.
Lemma 19: Suppose that L > M. Then, for every threshold h > 0 and subset B ⊆ N we have
Proof: For simplicity, we suppress the dependence on threshold h. As far as it concerns the false alarm rate of the proposed schemes, the worst case scenario regarding the data in the corrupt sensors is when the CUSUM statistics from the corrupt sensors are never smaller than the ones from the honest sensors, i.e., min
In this case, τ (L) coincides with the (L − M)-honest alarm, i.e., τ (L) = σ (L−M) , T L stops as soon as L−M honest CUSUM statistics are simultaneously above h, i.e., T L = S L−M , and T L stops when the sum of the lowest L honest CUSUM statistics is above h, i.e., T L = S L . As far as it concerns the detection delay of the proposed rules, the worst-case scenario regarding the data in the corrupt sensors is when
Then, τ (L) stops as soon as L honest sensors have raised an alarm, i.e., τ (L) = σ (L) , T L stops at the first time L honest CUSUM statistics are simultaneously above h, i.e., T L = S L , whereas T L stops when the sum of the L − M lowest honest CUSUM statistics crosses h, i.e., T L = S L−M . In view of Lemma 3, this completes the proof.
C. The Range of L
From (63)-(64) it follows that for τ (L) and T L to control the worst case false alarm rate, L needs to be larger than M, and for τ (L) and T L to have non-trivial detection delay, L needs to be at most equal to the size of the affected subset, |B|, or equivalently at least L honest sensors need to be affected by the change. Thus, for these detection rules we will require that
where the last inequality always holds because |B| ≤ |N | = K − M.
On the other hand, from (65) it follows that for Low-Sum-CUSUM, T L , to control the worst-case false alarm rate, L needs to be at most equal to the number of honest sensors, K − M (otherwise, a corrupt CUSUM statistic will always be included in the detection statistic), and for T L to have nontrivial detection delay, we need not only L > M, but also that L − M > |N | − |B|, or equivalently L > K − |B| (see the discussion prior to Lemma 16) . Consequently, for T L we require that
This condition implies that for T L to detect the change, the size of the affected subset must satisfy
where again the first inequality always holds.
D. A Special Case
From conditions (66)-(67) it follows that in all cases we have M+1 ≤ |B| ≤ |N | = K −M. A particular case of interest is when K − M = M + 1, in which case all honest sensors need to be affected (B = N ). Then, conditions (66)-(67) imply that the only possible value for L is M + 1 for all three schemes, and Theorem 19 reveals a clear ordering for these schemes. This is the content of Corollary 20 below, for which we use the notion of domination in Definition 1.
Corollary 20: Suppose that all honest sensors are affected (B = N ) and that |N | ≡ K − M = M + 1. Then, the (M + 1)-alarm, τ (M+1) , dominates the voting rule, T M+1 , and the latter dominates Low-Sum-CUSUM, T M+1 .
Proof: Fix some arbitrary h > 0. Then, it suffices to show
In view of Lemma 19, it suffices to show
By definition, σ (L) (h) ≤ S L (h), with equality when L = 1, therefore it suffices to show that
The equality holds because by definition S 1 (h) coincides with the consensus rule S |N | (h), and we further assume that |N | = M + 1. The inequality holds because when |N | = M +1, S M+1 (h) coincides with Sum-CUSUM, ρ N (h), defined in (28) , which can never be larger than the corresponding first honest alarm, i.e., ρ N (h) ≤ σ (1) 
In what follows, we focus on the asymptotic performance of the proposed rules. This will allow us to compare them when M + 1 < K − M, and also to provide a quantification of the inflicted performance loss due to the presence of corrupt sensors when the false alarm rate is small.
E. Asymptotic Analysis of the L th Alarm
In this section we characterize the performance of the L th alarm, τ (L) , when (66) holds, to a first-order asymptotic approximation.
Theorem 21:
Proof: From (63) we have that for every h > 0
Thus, it suffices to show that if
From (18) we have E B 0 [σ (L) (h)] ∼ h/I as h → ∞, and from (22) that h γ ∼ log γ as γ → ∞, which implies (69).
Remark 22: Theorem 21 shows that the first-order asymptotic performance of the L th alarm is the same for any value of L between M + 1 and |B|. In view of Remark 7, the proposed choice for L is the smallest possible. This suggest setting L = M + 1, independently of whether the size of the affected subset is known in advance or not.
F. Asymptotic Analysis of the Centralized L th Alarm
The detection performance of the L th alarm can be improved significantly if it is applied to groups of sensors, instead of individual sensors, an idea that was suggested in [17] in the special case M = 1. Indeed, let C 1 , . . . , C 2M+1 be a partition of [K ], i.e.,
Letτ i (h) be the CUSUM stopping time of the i th group, i.e.,
is defined in (59). In the following theorem we characterize the first-order asymptotic performance of the detection rule that stops when M+1 groups have raised an alarm, i.e., atτ (M+1) (h), wherě τ (1) 
For simplicity of presentation, for the following theorem we restrict ourselves to the case that all honest sensors are affected by the change (B = N ) , and K is a multiple of 2M + 1. Moreover, we denote byŇ the subset of honest groups, by {σ k , k ∈Ň } the alarm times from only the honest groups, and we setσ (1) 
Theorem 23: Suppose that B = N , K is a multiple of 2M + 1, and consider a partition (70) in which all subsets have the same size, that is K /(2M + 1). If we set h = h γ so that E ∞ [σ (1) 
Proof: In the worst-case scenario for both the detection delay and the false alarm rate, there are M groups that contain exactly one corrupt sensor each, and all other groups consist of only honest sensors. Then, similarly to (63) we have for every h > 0 that
and similarly to (17) and (18) it can be shown that
which implies (71). Remark 24: A comparison of (68) and (71) reveals that, under the conditions of Theorem 23, the centralized (M + 1)-alarm is asymptotically more efficient than the decentralized (M + 1)-alarm (recall Definition 2), since its first-order asymptotic detection delay is K /(2M + 1) smaller. We will see in the next sections that we can achieve even better asymptotic performance with the other two procedures under consideration.
Remark 25: The decentralized and centralized secondalarms, τ (2) andτ (2) , were proposed in [17] in the case that all honest sensors are affected, and asymptotic upper bounds were obtained for their performance. Setting M = 1 in Theorems 21 and 23, we improve upon these results by characterizing the performance of τ (2) andτ (2) up to a firstorder asymptotic approximation.
G. Asymptotic Analysis of the Voting Rule
We now study the asymptotic performance of the voting rule, T L , that was defined in (61).
Theorem 26:
Proof: From (64) we know that for every h > 0
and completes the proof. Remark 27: From (72) it follows that the asymptotic worsecase detection delay of the voting rule, T L , is decreasing in L, which implies that L should be as large as possible. Since L must be at most equal to the size of the affected subset, |B|, this means that the selection of L in the family of voting rules depends heavily on prior knowledge regarding |B|. Indeed, in the absence of any information, L must be set equal to M + 1, and the resulting first-order asymptotic performance is the same as that of the (M + 1)-alarm, τ (M+1) . On the other hand, in the ideal case that |B| is known in advance, the asymptotic approximation (72) suggests setting L = |B|, in which case the resulting first-order asymptotic performance is |B| − M times smaller than that of the (M + 1)-alarm. We will now see that this asymptotic performance is achieved by Low-Sum-CUSUM, without prior knowledge of |B|.
H. Asymptotic Performance of Low-Sum-CUSUM
We now turn to the asymptotic analysis of Low-Sum-CUSUM, that was defined in (62).
Theorem 28:
Proof: From (65) we have for every h > 0 that
and from Theorem 17 that if h = h γ is selected so that E ∞ [ S L (h γ )] = γ , then h γ ∼ (L/|N |) log γ . Thus, setting h = h γ in the previous relationship and using the fact that |N | = K − M, we obtain (74). The asymptotic performance (74) of Low-Sum-CUSUM is decreasing in L, which implies that L should be selected equal to its largest possible value, K − M. Therefore, the proposed value of L for Low-Sum-CUSUM does not require knowledge of the size of the affected subset. The following corollary describes the resulting first-order asymptotic performance.
Corollary 29:
I. Discussion
We now summarize the main results of this section. First of all, in the special case that K − M = M + 1, the only possible choice for L for all three families under consideration is M +1 and, for any given false alarm rate, the (M +1)-alarm dominates the corresponding voting rule, T M+1 , and the latter dominates the corresponding Low-Sum-CUSUM, T M+1 .
When K − M > M + 1, the proposed values for L are M + 1 and K − M for τ (L) and T L , respectively, thus, they do not require knowledge of the size of the affected subset, |B|. With these choices, the first-order asymptotic detection delay of Low-Sum-CUSUM, T K −M is |B| − M smaller than that of the (M + 1)-alarm. On the other hand, the selection of L for the voting rule, T L , depends on prior knowledge regarding |B|. However, even in the ideal case that |B| is known in advance, the asymptotic performance of the voting rule with L = |B|, T |B| , is the same as that of Low-Sum-CUSUM, T K −M .
Finally, we found that although the centralized (M + 1)alarm achieves much better asymptotic performance than the corresponding decentralized (M + 1)-alarm, it is always asymptotically less efficient than Low-Sum-CUSUM.
Remark 30: In Section III we saw that, in the absence of corrupt sensors, it is possible to achieve the optimal asymptotic performance (14) for any affected subset B ⊆ N , up to a firstorder asymptotic approximation, or even up to a constant term, even if there is absolutely no information about the affected subset. This is not the case in the presence of corrupt sensors, at least for the detection rules that we study here. Indeed, comparing (13) with (75) we can see that the best first-order asymptotic performance that can be achieved by the proposed procedures is the same as that of a centralized CUSUM rule that utilizes only |B| − M, not |B|, honest, affected senors.
V. SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS
We now illustrate our theoretical findings in the previous section with two simulation studies where all honest sensors are normally distributed with variance 1 and have mean 0 before the change and 1 after the change, i.e., f = N (0, 1) and g = N (1, 1) . That is, all honest sensors are affected by the change (B = N ). In the first simulation study there are M = 2 corrupt and |N | = 3 honest sensors, therefore K = 2M + 1. In Figures 1(a) ,(c) we compare the performance of the (M + 1)-alarm, τ (M+1) , the voting rule, T M+1 , and Low-Sum-CUSUM, T M+1 . As predicted by Corollary 20, we see that τ (M+1) dominates T M+1 , and that T M+1 dominates T M+1 for any level of the false alarm rate.
In the second simulation study we have M = 1 corrupt and |N | = 5 honest sensors, thus, K > 2M+1. In Figures 1(b),(d) , we compare the performance of τ (M+1) , T K −M , and the voting rule, T K −M , which assumes knowledge of the fact that all honest sensors are affected. Moreover, we consider the centralized version of the (M + 1)-alarm studied in Section IV-E. As expected from our asymptotic results, we observe that the centralized (M + 1)-alarm performs better than the decentralized (M + 1)-alarm, τ (M+1) , but worse compared to the voting rule T K −M . A more interesting observation is that Low-Sum-CUSUM, T K −M , dominates the voting rule, T K −M , despite the fact that they have the same first-order asymptotic performance.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In the classical multisensor sequential change-detection problem, data are collected sequentially from a number of sensors, and the goal is to detect quickly and accurately a change that is perceived by only an unknown subset of these sensors, while the observations in all non-affected sensors continue following their initial distribution. In this classical setup, any model mis-specification in the non-affected sensors is ignored and underestimated. In this paper we considered a different formulation of this problem, in which at most M unknown sensors are considered to be unreliable and are treated as if they are controlled by an adversary. This generalizes the formulation in [17] in that we allow for more than one corrupt sensors, i.e., M ≥ 1, and we assume that the subset, B, of honest sensors affected by the change is unknown. We proposed three families of detection rules and we evaluated them under a generalization of Lorden's criterion that considers the worst case scenario regarding the strategy of the adversary, when there are exactly M corrupt sensors. However, as in the classical multichannel setup, we did not adopt a worst-case approach with respect to the affected subset of sensors, B.
The first proposed procedure stops as soon as M + 1 local CUSUM statistics have crossed a common threshold. This procedure was shown to be better, in an exact sense, than all other proposed rules considered here in the special that there are M + 1 honest sensors, all affected by the change.
In the general case that the number of honest sensors exceeds the number of corrupt sensors by more than 1, the previous scheme can be very inefficient, as its first-order asymptotic performance is independent of the size of the affected subset. We showed however that it is possible to achieve much better performance with a novel procedure, which also does not require knowledge of the actual number of affected honest sensors. This procedure stops as soon as the sum of the smallest K − M local CUSUM statistics crosses a fixed threshold, and we refer to it as Low-Sum-CUSUM. We show that its first-order asymptotic performance is the same as that of a centralized CUSUM that relies on |B|− M honest sensors, all affected by the change. We conjecture that this is the best possible first-order asymptotic performance in the presence of M corrupt sensors, but the proof of this result is an open problem.
These results are not relevant only for the design of sequential change-detection rules in an adversarial setup, but can also be useful for the "robustification" of existing multichannel procedures. Indeed, when there is a large number of sensors, K , and a non-trivial lower bound Q on the size of the affected subset, our results suggest that Low-Sum-CUSUM with a small M ≤ Q can lead to more robust behavior with a relatively small price in efficiency.
The procedures under consideration have low computational complexity. The heavier communication requirements from the sensors to the fusion center are imposed by Low-Sum-CUSUM, which requires that each sensor transmits the value of its local CUSUM statistic at each time. It is possible to design bandwidth-efficient modifications of this scheme, thresholding each local CUSUM statistic below and communicating only when its value is above this threshold [24] . It is also possible to design energy-efficient modifications of Low-Sum-CUSUM [25] , where the local CUSUM statistics do not need to be observed continuously at the sensors.
Similarly to [17] , we have focused on the case that the pre-change distribution is the same in all honest sensors, and the post-change distribution is the same in all honest sensors affected by the change. Another interesting generalization of our work is in the non-homogeneous setup. Finally, our setup is clearly relevant in security related applications, in which case an interesting alternative approach is a game-theoretic formulation.
APPENDIX
In this Appendix, all random variables are defined on some probability space ( , F , P).
Lemma 31: Let X g , Y g be independent, non-negative, integer-valued random variables, parametrized by some positive constant g.
(i) If P(X g ≤ t) ≤ t/g for every t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ., then E[X g ] ≥ g/2.
Proof: (i) By assumption and the non-negativity of probability it follows that P(X g > t) ≥ (1 − t/g) + for every t = 0, 1, . . .. Therefore,
(ii) From the independence of X g and Y g it follows that P(X g > t, Y g > t) = P(X g > t) P(Y g > t) = P(Y g > t) − P(X g ≤ t) · P(Y g > t)
for every t = 0, 1, . . .. Therefore,
and it suffices to show that the second term on the right-hand side goes to 0 as g → ∞. Indeed, by the assumption on the cdf of X g we have
and the upper bound goes to 0 by the assumption on the second moment on Y g . Lemma 32: Let ξ 1 , . . . , ξ |N | be independent, exponential random variables with mean 1, and consider the order-statistics ξ (1) Proof: Set ξ 0 = 0. From the Rényi representation [26] it follows that the spacings η j = ξ ( j ) − ξ ( j −1) , 1 ≤ j ≤ |N | are independent, exponential random variables such that When L = |N |, G L coincides with H N defined in (30), and the result follows from (32). Lemma 33 [28] : Let {U i t } t ∈N , 1 ≤ i ≤ M be (possibly dependent) random walks with positive drifts. That is, for any given 1 ≤ i ≤ M, the increments {U i t − U i t −1 } t ∈N are integrable, iid random variables with mean μ i > 0. Consider the family of stopping times
where b > 0. Then, as b → ∞ we have
Proof: This is a special case of [28, Th. 3] 
